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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AqImummunIvE LAw-CoMmON CARRIERS-ROUTE CERTIFICATION:
REGULATED COMPETITION FAVORED UNDER PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
ANDNECEssrrY STAR um-Black Ball Freight Service, Inc. v. Wash-
ington Utilities and Transportation Commission, 74 Wn. 2d 871,
447 P.2d 597 (1968).
Plaintiff was a large, diversified land and water carrier operating
throughout the Puget Sound area. Since 1962, when it absorbed the
only other motor carrier providing such service, plaintiff had had
the sole certification for "regular route, scheduled service" between
south Kitsap County and the city of Seattle.' When the Washing-
ton Utilities and Transportation Commission [hereinafter cited as
W.U.T.C.] granted additional "regular route, scheduled service"
authority for the same area to one of the plaintiff's motor freight com-
petitors, plaintiff filed suit to have the board's decision declared invalid.
Plaintiff argued that the W.U.T.C.'s finding that "adequate" service
was being given in the area precluded any additional certification,
and that his high operating ratio2 and possible loss of revenue would
necessarily lead to such a deterioration of service as to require denial
1. The area was also served, however, by a variety of smaller irregular route and
non-scheduled carriers.
2. Black Ball Freight Service, Inc. v. Washington Util. and Transp. Comm'n, 74
Wn. 2d 871, 881 n.3, 447 P.2d 597, 600 n.3:
The operating ratio is the percentage of costs and expenses to total revenues re-
ceived. An operating ratio of 98 per cent means that expenses and depredation
amount to 98 per cent of total revenues and that there is a net profit of only 2
per cent.
The I.C.C. has explained the utility of an operating ratio in Middle West General
Increases, 48 M.C.C. 541, 552-553 (1948):
In industries where the amount of investment is large in relation to total costs,
the rate of return on investment generally has been accepted as appropriate for
determining revenue needs. In. such industries the risk is related more to the amount
of the investment and less to costs. On the other hand, where the amount of the
investment is relatively small in relation to total costs, investment is not the pri-
mary factor in determining revenue needs. . . . The owners of motor carriers can
hardly be expected to look to the return on the amount of their investment as an
incentive where the principal risk is attached to the substantially greater amount
of expense.
Thus the special economic characteristics of the motor carrier industry demand careful
scrutiny of the revenue and expense margin to guarantee sufficient revenue to meet
current operating expenses. While the I.C.C. considers an operating ratio of 93 to be
reasonable for motor carriers, state commissions often use higher ratios ranging from
95 to 98. C. P s, THE Ecoxov-cs OF REGIULAo 275 (1965).
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of applicant's petition for increased authority. The Washington Su-
preme Court held: a possible loss of revenue and the existence of
presently adequate service does not prevent authorization of additional
competition required by present or future public convenience and
necessity. Black Ball Freight Service, Inc. v. Washington Util. and
Transp. Comm'n, 74 Wn. 2d 871, 447 P.2d 597 (1968).
The Black Ball decision is the Washington court's first interpreta-
tion of a 1963 amendment providing that a permit shall be issued to a
common carrier only when its operations'
are or will be required by the present or future public conve-
nience and necessity, otherwise such application shall be denied.
Prior to the 1963 "public convenience and necessity" amendment,
various criteria such as "sound economic conditions," "efficient ser-
vice," "reasonable charges," and "public interest" had been em-
ployed by the legislature to regulate motor carrier certification.'
Early Washington cases based on these standards had been gen-
erally protective of existing carriers' regulated monopolies,5 and
had not been explicitly overruled by such later cases as State ex rel.
Adams Transp., Inc. v. Wash. Public Service Comm'n,6 which upheld
3. WASH. REv. CODE § 81.80.070 (1969), as amended by ch. 242, [1963] Wash.
Sess. Laws.
4. See Comment, Standards For The Granting of Motor Carrier Operating Author-
ity, 38 WASH. L. REv. 465, 466-71 (1963); and D. HARPER, ECONOMlIC REGULATION OF
THE MOTOR TRuCKING INDUSTRY BY THE STATES, 62-66, 119-21 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as HARPER], for a summary of the different statutory standards and administrative
policies utilized by the Washington transportation commissions from 1920 to 1963.
5. Taylor-Edwards v. Dept. Pub. Serv., 22 Wn. 2d 565, 157 P.2d 309 (1945), and
State ex rel. Morrison v. Dept. of Transportation, 32 Wn. 2d 580, 202 P.2d 916 (1949),
were two early cases which marked Washington's transportation policy as favoring
"regulated monopoly." In both decisions, the court and commission were solicitous of
the existing carriers' business, refusing to authorize new competition because the exist-
ing carriers would lose revenue and customers, and because the applicant had not shown
present services to be inadequate in the areas for which he applied. For a more detailed
explanation of the decisions see Comment, Standards For The Granting of Motor Car-
tier Operating Authority, 38 WASH. L. Rxv. 465, 468-469 (1963).
6. 54 Wn. 2d 382, 340 P.2d 784 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Adams]. This case
dealt with the transfer of an authority to carry bulk cement to another permit holder
over the protests of other competitive carriers. Construing the "Declaration of Policy"
in WAsH. REv. CODE § 81.80.070, the Adams court noted that the state constitution
prohibited monopolies, and that the real purpose of the act was not the protection of
existing carriers from competition, but the avoidance of "unfair or destructive com-
petitive practices." The court felt these prohibited practices would only encompass
such competitive practices as would impair the transportation service available to
the public. The fact that competition might be injurious to the respondents is of
no moment unless it would have that result.
54 Wn. 2d at 385, 340 P.2d at 786.
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beneficial competition. However, in State ex rel. Bremerton Transfer
& Storage v. Wash. Util. and Transp. Comm'n,7 a case decided in 1966
under the pre-1963 statutory language, the court noted parenthetically
that the new "public convenience and necessity" standard overruled
part of the Adams decision. The implication was that the amendment
would be construed conservatively insofar as competition was con-
cerned,' despite an increasingly liberal transportation policy espoused
in other states, in the federal courts, and by the national executive
branch.'
In rejecting this dictum of Bremerton Transfer, the Black Ball
decision is to be applauded for its conclusions, though it is subject to
criticism for its rather jejune reasoning. In determining the legisla-
ture's intent the court was content to recite the federal cases without
The Adams interpretation of "unfair or destructive competitive practices" was cited
with approval in State v. Washington Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 Wn. 2d 32, 354 P.2d 711
(1960), and N. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Washington Util. and Transp. Comm'n, 69 Wn. 2d
472, 418 P.2d 735 (1966).
One year after Adams, the Washington Supreme Court again recognized the public's
interest in further competition. State ex rel. Ry. Express v. Wash. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
57 Wn. 2d 32, 354 P.2d 711 (1960), involved the grant of an intercity permit for the
carriage of packages to United Parcel which was protested by several previously certi-
fied common carriers and sixteen short-line carriers. The appellant contended that it
had a statutory right to be free from action of the Commission which granted an un-
fair advantage to a competitor. Reaffirming the Adams' interpretation of WASH. REV.
CODE § 81.80.070, the court noted that competition was only unfair and destructive
when it impaired the transportation services already available to the public.
In a more recent case, N. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Washington Pub. Util. and Transp.
Comm'n, 69 Wn. 2d 472, 418 P.2d 735 (1966), "impairment" was established and the
application denied. The latter case should not be read as indicating a retreat from the
Adams preference for increased competition, but rather as an application of the Adams
formula. Thus after Adams, and Railway Express, certification in Washington of com-
mon carriers closely paralleled the federal policies under "public convenience and neces-
sity", i.e., a deemphasis of the effects of new competition on existing carriers unless
those carriers were thereby forced to restrict their operations.
7. 67 Wn. 2d 876, 410 P.2d 602 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bremerton Transfer &
Storage).
8. We also feel that the trial court was in error in ruling that the Commission's
findings of fact and conclusions of law Nos. 6 and 7 were unsupported by material
and substantial evidence. Under the rule in State ex rel. Adams . .. the fact that
competitors may be injured is not a relevant factor in determining whether a permit
will be granted. (This case has been overruled by the 1963 amendment to R.C.W.
§ 81.80.070, but was in effect when this case was heard.)
Bremerton Transfer & Storage, 67 Wn. 2d 876, 881, 410 P.2d 602, 605 (1966).
9. In his TRANSPORTATiON SYsTEM OF OuR NATION MESSAGE FROM THE PRESmENT
TO CONGRESS, April 5, 1962, H.R. Doc. No. 384, 87th Cong. 2d sess., President John F.
Kennedy deplored the obsolete and inconsistent regulatory policies inhibiting trans-
portation growth and efficiency. Unfortunately, bills introduced by the President to
"deregulate" rates on bulk commodities and to increase freer competition were killed
by the opposition of the I.C.C., water carriers, large trucking concerns and adversely
affected producers. See A. FRiEDLAEDER, THE DMxMA or FRiGHT TRANSPORT REGu-
LATIOx 163 (1969).
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analyzing them or considering other useful tools of statutory con-
struction.
Legislative intent may be derived from a variety of sources: (1) of-
ficial documentation of the legislature's purpose, (2) the language of
the statute, (3) the prevalent construction of similar statutory lan-
guage and (4) the nature of the problem with which the legislature
was dealing. There is no official documentation of legislative purpose
regarding the Washington act.10 As for the language of the statute
itself, "public convenience and necessity" is an undefined term in the
Washington statute, as in the federal statutes. Hence, an evaluation
of the Black Ball decision must rest upon an analysis of cases con-
struing similar provisions in other jurisdictions," and the economics
of the motor carrier industry.
1. Federal Authority
Without close analysis of the opinions, the Black Ball court noted
that federal precedent in construction of the statute would be "cogent
authority,"' 2 since for almost thirty years'" federal courts and the
10. Based on conversations with legislators and commission officials actively serving
at the time of the 1963 amendment's passage, this writer has concluded that much of
the support for the amendment actually came from the motor carrier industry's hope
that it would be construed in a way that would restrict further competition.
Another more practical reason for the adoption of a "public convenience and neces-
sity" standard was the Second Proviso exception of 49 U.S.C. § 306(a) (1964). It
provided that no federal certificate of public convenience and necessity was required
for operations of interstate commerce by motor carriers operating solely within a single
state, if they had already been granted a public convenience and necessity authority
from that state's commission. And since Washington had not operated under such a
standard from 1935 to 1963, rights granted by the Washington commissions could not
be registered under the federal exemption. Crumpacker Common Carrier Application,
4 M.C.C. 264 (1938); Tooker Common Carrier Application, 12 M.C.C. 552 (1939).
Consequently, state carriers were forced to make a separate showing of public conven-
ience and necessity to the I.C.C. with commensurate additional expense and delay. The
1963 amendment thus offered the industry a more expeditious method of acquiring in-
terstate commerce authority for intrastate hauling similar to that enjoyed by carriers
in many other states.
11. See Chandler, Convenience and Necessity: Motor Carrier Licensing by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 28 011O ST. L. R v. 379, 389 (1967).
12. Black Ball Freight, 74 Wn. 2d at 874, 447 P.2d at 599 (1968).
One reason for the prevalence of state reliance on federal transportation law is the
relative scarcity at the state level of a systematic compilation and digesting of local
motor carrier cases. In 1968 the W.U.T.C. began to annotate its more important motor
carrier cases by issuing the first of its "Transportation Reports." The Public Utilities
Reporter also carries selected state commission transportation decisions, but its inclusion
of many different types of railroad, gas and electric decisions curtails any extensive
coverage of state transportation policies.
13. When the Interstate Commerce Act was amended in 1935 by the Motor Carrier
820
Common Carriers-Route Certification
I.C.C. had been construing the federal statute14 from which the Wash-
ington statute was adopted almost verbatim. While it was certainly
correct to cite federal authority, the court should also have analyzed it
for two reasons: first, to ensure that the federal precedent which it
cited was good law in 1963, revealing a discernible trend recognized
by the legislature; and secondly, to judge whether, under the applicable
standard, the W.U.T.C. had properly acted within its administrative
discretion in granting certification in this case.
In opinions beginning with Pan American Buslines Operation15 in
1936, the I.C.C. had taken a rather protectionist tack which appeared
to favor "regulated monopoly."16 An application would be summarily
denied if existing service was found to be "adequate.""lr The pos-
sibility of a reduction of an existing line's revenues or operations prac-
Act, Congress chose to insert the same "public convenience and necessity" standard
which had been employed for similar purposes for railroads since the Transportation
Act of 1920, sec. 402 (18) and (20), 41 Stat. 477-78 (1920). According to Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1944), this use of "public convenience
and necessity" for motor carriers indicated a continuation of the judicial and administra-
tive interpretation of the language fostered under the earlier railroad regulation. Thus,
while the I.C.C. had only regulated motor carriers under a "public convenience and ne-
cessity" standard for twenty-eight years before Washington adopted the phrase, the
administrative and judicial history of "public convenience and necessity" was actually
over forty years old.
14. 49 U.S.C. § 307 (1964).
15. 1 M.C.C. 190 (1936).
16. The question, in substance, is whether the new operation or service will serve
a useful purpose, responsive to a public demand or need; whether this purpose can
and will be served as well by existing lines or carriers; and whether it can be served
by the applicant with the new operation or service proposed with6ut endangering
or impairing the operations of existing carriers contrary to the public interest.
Id. at 203.
Cf. Arrow Transp. Co. v. Hill, 236 Ore. 174, 387 P.2d 559, 563 (1963):
The legislative policy in this state is to regard motor carrier competition as de-
sirable and to subject that competition to regulation only to the extent that it is
necessary to do so in serving the public interest. . . . This is to be contraited with
the protection which is given existing carriers under the test of public convenience
and necessity as traditionally applied. Under the latter test the existing carrier en-
joys a modified form of monopoly, having the right to serve expanding needs if
it can handle them adequately.
17. Chandler Trailer Convoy, Inc., 83 M.C.C. 577, 580 (1960):
We have repeatedly found that in the absence of a showing of material inadequacy
in the services of available carriers, we are not warranted in authorizing the en-
trance of a competitive newcomer in the field. We believe this to be a salutary
rule ...
Federal cases are collected in Hudson Transit Lines v. United States, 82 F. Supp.
153, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See also Consolidated Freight Ways, Inc., 79 M.C.C. 17, 25
(1959); Morgan Drive-Away, Inc., 78 M.C.C. 698, 700 (1959); L.A. Tucker Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Mo. 1953); William F. Crossett,
76 M.C.C. 661, (1958); Strickland Transportation Company, Inc., 77 M.C.C. 655
(1958), aff'd 186 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
State cases applying the same test are listed in HARPER, supra note 4, at 106-07.
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tically precluded "public convenience and necessity" certification of
a potential competitor; and in order to protect the resident carrier
from a loss of revenue, it was often given a chance to correct defi-
ciencies in service before a new applicant would be authorized to
compete.18
But federal courts reviewing the I.C.C. eventually rejected regulated
monopoly in favor of "regulated competition."'" Inadequacy of service
and potential loss of revenue by the existing carrier became only two
of many factors that could be weighed in the consideration of public
convenience and necessity. On the other hand, the I.C.C. demanded
proof of inadequacy as late as 1960;2o and rejection of such stan-
dards-a slow process reflected in numerous, and often conflicting
district court decisions 21-became apparent only in the late 1950's
18. Curtis, Inc., 92 M.C.C. 25, 32 (1961). And see Highway Transp. Inc., 76 M.C.C.
209, 213 (1958):
We have consistently held that existing carriers should be afforded an opportunity
to transport all of the traffic which they can handle adequately, economically, and
efficiently in the territory they serve before a new carrier is permitted to enter the
field.
The I.C.C. demanded that an applicant show specifically that the revenues of existing
carriers would not be diminished, Greyhound Corp. Extension of Operation-Bangor,
Maine, 33 M.C.C. 517 (1942), and that existing carriers be given the opportunity to
transport all the traffic they could handle efficiently before additional competition would
be authorized, Walter Benson, Inc., 61 M.C.C. 128 (1952); New York Central Railway
Co., 61 M.C.C. 457 (1953).
State regulation under public convenience and necessity statutes was equally solicitous
of existing carriers' revenues and operations. See HARPER, supra note 17, at 108-10.
19. Midwest Emery Freight System, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 403 (N.D.
Ill. 1968); Alabama Highway Express, Inc. v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 714 (N).
Ala. 1968); United Van Lines, Inc. v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Mo. 1967);
Texas Mexican Railway v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Sloan's
Moving & Storage Co. v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Mo. 1962), af'd per
curiam, 374 U.S. 95 (1963); Campus Travel Inc. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). The last four cases were cited in Black Ball Freight Service, Inc. v.
Washington Util. and Transp. Comm'n, 74 Wn. 2d 871, 447 P.2d 597 (1968). But
see Van Dyke Trucking, Inc. v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. Wash. 1968).
Earlier cases advocating a regulated competition approach were: Associated Transp.,
Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Mo. 1958); Dance Freight lines, Inc. v.
United States, 149 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ky. 1957); Southern Kansas Greyhound Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 502 (W.D. Mo. 1955); St. Johnsbury Trucking Co.
v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 977 (D. Vt. 1951); Norfolk Southern Bus Corp. v.
United States, 96 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1950) ; C.E. Hall & Sons, Inc. v. United States,
88 F. Supp. 596 (1950); Lang Transp. Corp. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.
Calif. 1948).
20. Chandler Trailer Convoy, Inc., 83 M.C.C. 577, 580 (1960). See also William F.
Crossett, Inc., Extension-Neville Island Pa., 76 M.C.C. 661 (1958); Strickland Transp.
Co., Inc. Extension-La. Routes, 77 M.C.C. 655 (1958), aff'd 186 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.
Tex. 1960).
21. Following the Hudson Transit Lines decision in 1948, a few courts held that
inadequacy was definitely a prerequisite for certification in the early 1950's. Clarke v.
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and early 19601s. Hence, it is possible that the legislature intended to
adopt the standards embodied in the older protectionist decisions.
More probably, however, the 1963 legislature was aware of the
rather clear trend of federal authority at that time favoring com-
petition. Federal courts have held that a loss of revenue was not justi-
fication for denial of an application where the existing carrier's service
was inadequate and the area was experiencing rapid economic and
population growth.22 It has also been held that a decrease in revenue
and tonnage expected by the existing carriers in a given area will not
preclude a "public convenience and necessity" certification when:
(1) competition is presently limited, (2) there are delays in deliveries
and shipments at the time of the hearing, (3) business in the area is
abundant, (4) a new line will afford the public more frequent service,
and (5) evidence indicates that the existing carrier will improve its
services in response to new competition.23
In post-1963 cases the strength of the trend favoring competition
has become even more apparent. Federal courts have held that the
absence of a finding of inadequacy is not by itself sufficient to bar the
issuance of a new certificate.24
The element of inadequacy is thus not a controlling one, but is
to be considered along with the other factors .... [I] t appears to
be the more reasonable view that the narrower conceptual ele-
ment of inadequacy of present service was not intended to be
imposed as a straight jacket upon the process of determining the
broader interests of public convenience and necessity...
Interstate carriers no longer necessarily get a chance to improve
United States, 101 F. Supp. 587, 591 (D.D.C. 1951); L.A. Tucker Truck Lines v.
United States, 115 F. Supp. 647, 649 (E.D. Mo. 1953). And judicial sentiment favoring
this approach continued into the early 1960's. See, Mercer, J. (dissenting), Burlington
Truck Lines, Inc. v. I.C.C., 194 F. Supp. 31, 63 (S.D. Ill. 1961) and cases cited therein.
A careful reading of the more recent cases cited in this dissent suggests that Judge Mer-
cer's interpretation is strained. The federal case precedent advocating that the Commission
must affirmatively make findings concerning the effect of new competition on existing
carriers faded even more quickly after the renunciation of this theory in Southern
Kansas Greyhound Lines v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 502, 506 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
Two decisions which did follow a strict "regulated monopoly" approach in demanding
an "effect" finding were Clarke v. United States, supra, and Luckenbach v. United
States, 122 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
22. Atlanta-New Orleans Motor Freight v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 364 (N.D.
Ga. 1961).
23. Inland Motor Freight v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 885 (D. Idaho 1941).




their services before a competitor is certified. The Supreme Court
rejected the contention that there is any "invariable rule" that a
commission must grant existing carriers an opportunity to remedy
deficiencies in service. 5 In sum, then, the federal courts have of late
shied away from inflexible rules in determining the exigencies of the
public convenience and necessity.
Given the facts established in Black Ball, it seems certain that the
federal courts would have reached the same result. The record in-
dicated that appellant's services in previous years had been better
when spurred by competition.2" The court indicated that a reliable
"one-day" delivery was needed by the businessmen of the area, and
that Black Ball and the nonscheduled carriers could not always be
counted on to maintain this type of daily service.27 Moreover, the
route certified was in an area capable of generating sufficient carriage
to support both Black Ball and the applicant. It is clear, then, that
the Washington court came to the correct result insofar as federal
precedent is concerned.
2. Economic policy
The court should also, however, have evaluated the W.U.T.C.'s deci-
sion in light of the general economic policies underlying the require-
ment of a finding of convenience and necessity. Few modern authori-
ties would deny that competition can be beneficial to the public. The
rigors of competition may stimulate a carrier to give better service
and, absent price regulation, lower his prices. On the other hand, de-
structive competition was originally a key factor in the demand for
strict regulation of carriers.2" Early abuses of the railroad monopolies
spawned a turbulent era of public demand for federal regulation of all
forms of transportation. But the railroad industry had economic char-
acteristics not present in the motor carrier industry. The large, fixed
costs of railroads, their "natural" monopolies over extensive areas,
25. United States v. Dixie Highway Express, Inc., 389 U.S. 409, 411 (1967); accord,
Alabama Highway Express, Inc. v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
For an excellent summary of the current weight accorded to the various factors con-
sidered in "public convenience and necessity" certification on the federal level, see
TRANSPORTATION LAW INSTITUTE, 1968, OPERATING RIGHTS APPLICATIONS, PAPERS AND
PROCEEDINGS 276-90 (1969).
26. Black Ball Freight, 74 Wn. 2d at 600, 447 P.2d at 876 (1968).
27. Id. at 599, n.2, 447 P.2d at 874, n.2 (1968).
28. See HARPER, supra note 4. See also note 31 infra.
824
Vol. 45: 817, 1970
Common Carriers-Route Certification
and other economic barriers to entry combined to produce intolerable
competitive practices. 29 In contrast, motor carriers have low fixed
costs, no natural monopolies, and economic conditions conducive to
easy entry. Consequently, the objections which have been raised
against free competition in the railroad industry are inapplicable to
motor carriers. 0
Another reason frequently advanced in favor of restricted competi-
tion among scheduled carriers is that indiscriminate entry by com-
petitors on the same route and schedules might reduce each carrier's
volume so much that the total quality and frequency of service offered
to the public would be substantially impaired. While this argument
has some merit, its limitations should be recognized. When the total
volume of freight hauled is appreciably greater than that required to
sustain any one carrier, it is doubtful that additional competition
would ever cause all of the carriers to restrict their services to a point
29. A long line of precedent construing the "public convenience and necessity"
standard in railroad regulatory legislation existed long before the same standard was
enacted for the motor carrier industry. In early motor carrier cases, then, it is under-
standable that courts turned to railroad cases in construing this phrase. See note 13
supra. However, the economic distinctions between the two industries indicate that the
public interest would not be served by identical standards.
Railroads usually had a natural monopoly over intermediate points on their routes,
hut competed on shipments to terminal points. For example, if two railroads had lines
between City A and City B, there would be competition as to shipments between
those cities, but since the lines almost always took divergent routes, both railroads
would have a monopoly as to shipments to or from intermediate points on their re-
spective lines. The large investment in rails, and maintenance thereof, caused fixed costs
to be extraordinarily high, and variable costs correspondingly low. Each railroad sought
as large a volume of freight as possible so that the fixed costs could be covered at
reasonable rates; and once there was sufficient volume to meet the fixed costs any addi-
tional freight carried was extremely profitable. The result was bitter competition for
freight going between terminal points with fares often doing little more than covering
variable costs. However, there was no competition over the intermediate points on the
routes so fares were set unconscionably high to help defray both the fixed costs and
to compensate for the low fares generated by excessive competition for shipments be-
tween terminal points. Invidious price discrimination was the consequence.
See generally, D. P. Locxnr, ECONOMICs OF TRANSPORTATION 129-54 (5th ed. 1960).
See also A. FRIEDLAENDER, THE DILEWra.A OF FREIO'T TRANSPORT REGULATIoN 7-27
(1969) for a brief history of the social pressures and economic factors which led to
the regulation of rail, motor and water carriers.
30. Several observers have even argued that the economic structure of the motor
carrier industry is conducive to normal competition, and hence requires little or no
regulation. See e.g., Colof, Private Carriage on Trial: Competition in the Motor-Trans-
portation Industry, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1204, 1222-26 (1969); A. FRIEDLAENDER, THE
DILEMMA OF FRImGHT TRANSPORT REGULATION, 164-66 (1969); C. P=Lnrs, THE Eco-
NOiadcs oF REGuLATION, 512-62 (1965); Pegrum, The Economic Basis for Public Policy
for Motor Transport, 28 LANn EcoNoMics 244 (1952); and J. C. NELSON, NEw CoN-
CEPTS IN TRANSPORTATION REGULATION, NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, TRANS-
PORTATION AND NATIONAL POLICY (1942).
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where the public could not secure adequate transportation. Only where
the route barely sustains one scheduled carrier does it become highly
probable that the entrance of a competing line will result in inadequate
service by both together.
Moreover, applications for certification under these latter condi-
tions would be few, since an entering carrier would not voluntarily
undertake a predictably unprofitable venture. It is admitted that such
ill-fated attempts were common during the Great Depression, causing
widespread instability in the industry and giving impetus to strict
federal regulation.3' Modernly, however, there is no reason to think
that the problem would recur to any great degree so long as the crucial
factor-depression of the markets governing the factors of produc-
tion-is not present. 2
In conclusion, it appears that the decision of the court to interpret
"public convenience and necessity" so as to promote easier entry and
increased competition, rather than to continue a protectivist policy of
regulated monopoly, was entirely correct. If there is any fault with
the opinion, it lies in the court's failure to meet the public interest issue
head on. The court's decision could, and should, have been supported
by reference to the economics of the motor carrier industry and by a
broader analysis of the federal experience with this standard rather
than an unquestioning acceptance of the outcome of federal precedent.
31. In American Trucking Association v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 312 (1953)
the Supreme Court described the situation leading to the enactment of the Motor Car-
rier Act as characterized by ease of entry and hence, "overcrowded with small economic
units which proved unable to satisfy the most minimal standards of safety or financial
responsibility." However, this situation would seem to call for a licensing scheme re-
quiring entrants to meet standards of safety and financial responsibility, rather than
the route and rate regulation system which was enacted.
32. In a period of widespread unemployment and general absence of economic op-
portunity, those industries which have low capital requirements and few barriers to
entry often suffer from excessive entry with consequent overcapacity and low prices.
This condition stems from dislocation of the labor and capital markets. Lack of viable
economic alternatives forces people to undertake marginal economic ventures whose
chances of success are doubtful. Such entry should not occur to any large degree in a
period of prosperity, since the existence of remunerative economic alternatives would
make entry into overcrowded industries look rather unattractive by comparison.
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